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2Abstract
This brief synthesizes doubts about the presently prevailing European 
Institutions’ narrative, which we will call ‘the received wisdom’. We con-
centrate on the long-term challenges and plead for more thinking on the 
allegedly positive relation between innovation, employment and growth in 
the face of opposing evidence coming from international organizations 
and academia. We argue that business as usual is not an option to deal 
with the present inequality and unemployment challenges. We suggest 
opening up the reflection to different economic paradigms, and to other 
sources of legitimate knowledge and scholarship, from bio-economics, to 
social inquiry and to non-neoclassical economics. Foremost, we argue 
that no progress is possible without reconsideration of normative ques-
tions such as ‘what’ do we wish to sustain and for ‘whom’. 
JEL: O10, O30, O52, P50
1. The clash between the ‘received wisdom’ and the new narratives
The current understanding is one where: the economic crisis is due to a 
malfunctioning of the financial markets which initiated on the other side 
of the Atlantic. To stop a negative loop between financial markets and 
real economy, Europe has acted quickly by designing new mechanisms 
and policy actions. Ireland and Latvia have made it out of the crisis by 
following the received policy recipes. Greece is back in the embrace of 
the financial markets. The market still remains the best solution to many 
problems, including those generated by the crisis. Globalization and inno-
vation are good for growth and jobs. Growth can be made inclusive, smart 
and sustainable. Innovation will drive us out of the crisis. Solving our 
problems of skill mismatches will alleviate unemployment. Light can be 
seen at the end of the tunnel and renewed growth is behind the corner. 
32  Recommendation 4: Give more prominence to the distribution of income, consumption and 
wealth: ‘Average income, consumption and wealth are meaningful statistics, but they do not 
tell the whole story about living standards. For example, a rise in average income could be 
unequally shared across groups, leaving some households relatively worse-off than others. 
Thus, average measures of income, consumption and wealth should be accompanied by indica-
tors that reflect their distribution. Median consumption (income, wealth) provides a better mea-
sure of what is happening to the “typical” individual or household than average consumption 
(income or wealth)’. CMEPSP, 2009. With increasing inequality it is not unusual for the mean 
to increase (driven by the high end tail of the distribution) while the median recedes. The same 
point is made by the OECD (2011).
3  See Mirowski (1991, 2011, 2013).
4  See Mirowski (2013). The book argues inter alia that commoditized science loses quality, as 
since the 1980’s research moves away from large research Laboratories of major corporations 
and universities into contract research organization (CRO) acting under budget pressure and 
short time horizons. See http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ viewdoc/download?doi= 10.1.1.92.7530& 
rep=rep1&type=pdf last accessed April 2014. 
5  See Piketty (2014). The main thesis of the book, supported by an impressive amount of data 
and research, is that capital income is rising faster than economic growth. As a result, a com-
paratively shrinking share goes to income earned from labour. The same argument has been 
made before; see International Labour Organization - ILO (2012). Piketty’s analysis has been 
questioned by Chris Giles on the Financial Times (May 23), Clive Crooks on Bloomberg (April 
20) and on a more theoretical ground by Debraj Ray (May 25). The analysis, defended by Paul 
Krugman on the New York Times (May 24) among others, seems to stand at the time of writing 
the present note.  
6  See Atkinson and Piketty (2010), Atkinson et al. (2011).
7  See Krugman’s (2014a) review of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century book, where 
he largely endorses Piketty’s work. Even for Wolf (2014c), for whom ‘Inequality […] is inevi-
table and to a degree even desirable’, still we should take notice that some moderation is desir-
able and ‘We are not seeing moderate rises in inequality’. Also interesting the take of another 
Nobel prize winner, in Solow (2014). 
But what if …    
 • … the concept of growth – intended as growth of GDP per capita 
– is devoid of salience as three decades of increasing inequality 
have made the mean inadequate to describe living standards, so 
that other measures such as the median should be used, as 
re commended by the Stiglitz report (CMEPSP 2009)
2
?
 • … Philip Mirowski is right, and the economic profession is still 
infatuated with a neoliberal creed and neoclassic economic stance 
which has been largely falsified by current events
3
. What if this is 
one of the root causes of the crisis? What if this creed has cor-
rupted the self-governance method of science and is now jeopar-
dizing the very mechanism of science driven innovation
4
?  
 • … Thomas Piketty
5
 (and Anthony Atkinson and Emmanuel Saez) 
are right
6
 and we are in a second Gilded Age – an era where the 
market does not deliver universal wellbeing but increased inequa-
lity, and prominence of capital over labour? What if growth – 
when it does take place during the span of the present crisis – 
only accrues to the better off? Note Krugman’s critique that the 
role of deregulation in this state of affairs is more important than 
Piketty stipulates
7
.
4 • … Erik Reinert is right and the roots of the European crises lie in 
the deindustrialization of the periphery which started long before 
the financial crisis? What if the present imbalance between the 
power of the financial sector and the real economy – which led to 
a negative debt-to-GDP spiral – needs to be addressed as being a 
core problem, as it was along the whole political axis during the 
1930s? What if he is also right in his critique of neoclassic eco-
nomics, where he says that we have unlearned the lesson of 
continental economics that development is driven by Schumpeterian 
dynamic imperfect competition [i.e. a piece of innovation works 
better when he who first introduces it is for some time protected 
from competition], and that the postulation of perfect competition 
and efficient markets was – at its roots - an expedient to keep 
developing countries from creating and industrial sector
8
. What if 
true development by innovation in the private sector needs heavy 
investments by the public one
9
? 
 • … Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee
10 
are right and the com-
bined effect of globalization and innovation creates an unprece-
dented condition of job destruction, one which the wealth created 
by innovation will not be capable of offsetting because of inelas-
ticity of consumption, speed of the change, and inequality in the 
distribution of wealth?
 • … Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne
11
, are likewise right 
that computerization alone could endanger most of our jobs (e.g. 
47% of the job market in the US)? 
 • … Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
12
 are right and increased 
inequality will foster the further growth of rent-extracting elites in 
a quintessential vicious circle?
 • … Kate Pickett, Richard Wilkinson
13
, Joseph Stiglitz
14
 and Adam Smith
15
 
are right [in at least this] that inequality corrodes trust and that the 
perception of unfairness makes society dysfunctional?     
8  See Reinert (2008).
9  See Mazzucato (2013).
10  See Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). This book is now being quoted almost everywhere in: 
The Economist (2014), Wolf (2014a, 2014b), and even by IMF’s Managing Director Christine 
Lagarde in a speech at Stanford University, on February 25 this year, see: http://www.imf.org/
external/np/speeches/ 2014/022514.htm, last accessed April 2014. A shorter, US-policy-mak-
er-adapted version of book is from The Futurist, http://www.wfs.org/ content/futurist/ march-
april-2012-vol-46-no-2/thriving-automated-economy, last accessed April 2014.
11  See Frey and Osborne (2013)
12  See Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
13  See Wilkinson and Pickett (2009).
14  See Stiglitz (2012).
15  See Smith (2009). On the concept of ‘fairness’ as a fundamental ingredient of the social 
fabric see also Akerlof and Shiller (2009, p. 19-25), and Saltelli and d’Hombres (2011).
5 • … Paul Krugman
16
 and Hal Salzman
17
 are right and the implication 
of globalization and innovation in a society where the marginal 
cost of production goes to zero, is that jobs will disappear, and 
that skill mismatches and STEM (science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics) penury have little or nothing to do with 
this?   
 • … Jeffrey Sachs and Laurence Kotlikoff
18
 are right and each new-
born generation will be worse off than its predecessor due to 
machines tilting the balance in favour of the elders?
 • … Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen got it right and natural resources’ 
scarcity has something to do with the present crisis
19
? Is it by 
chance that the beginning of the global financial crisis coincides 
with the flattening global supply of oil? What if from 2005 
onwards conventional production of oil reached a plateau (Peak 
Oil) and it is now inelastic
20
, unable to respond to rising demand
21
?
This brief aims to expand on these elements of reflection, further ques-
tioning the received wisdom. Some of the scholars see the future opened 
by these threads as dystopian. In Ranciere and Kumhof (2010) theoreti-
cal approach, inequality would end up in a deep financial crisis; this is 
mainly due to unsustainable borrowing driven by the need to narrow the 
gap in consumption between capital and labour owners. Ravetz (2013) 
sees war as a candidate strategy to stabilize a system where the mar-
ginal cost of production is zero due to innovation, like in George Orwell’s 
novel 1984. 
Those who oppose present European Union policies now hypothesize 
fiscal colonialism
22
 and ‘Latin-Americanisation’ of European count-
16  [...] the belief that America suffers from a severe “skills gap” is one of those things that 
everyone important knows must be true, because everyone they know says it’s true. It’s a prime 
example of a zombie idea — an idea that should have been killed by evidence, but refuses to 
die. See Krugman (2014b). 
17  Despite naysayers, the nation is producing more than enough quality workers in scientific 
and engineering fields—and policymakers and industry leaders should proceed accordingly. See 
Salzman (2013). 
18  See Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012).
19  See Giampietro et al. (2012).
20  See Murray and King (2012).
21  In a zero-sum game, countries such as China and India increasing their consumption of oil 
implies developed ones reducing theirs. In relation to this predicament non-conventional oil 
reserves and alternative energies do not seem to be able to provide effective substitutes in the 
short-medium term at the global scale. See Kerr (2012) and Smil (2008).
22  An expression used by Philippe Legrain, a former economic adviser to the European Com-
mission president, see http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/opinion/euro-zone-fiscal-colonial-
ism.html?_r=0 last accessed April 2014.
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23
. Others see the present crisis as the result of a secular tension 
between capitalism and democracy, whereby the present regime of fiscal 
consolidation is the most recent episode of a drama where the fiscal 
states become debtor states, hostage to globalized markets, and the 
citizens lose all chances to influence a conflict which now plays itself at 
the global scale between financial markets, international organizations 
and states. In this scenario the European Union becomes an executive 
federalism – ‘a reconstitution of capitalist democracy in Europe in the 
sense of a solidification of the results of three decades of economic libe-
ralization
24
. Whether this should lead to the dissolution of the European 
project or to its completion is the subject of a heated debate between 
Wolfgang Streeck and Jürgen Habermas
25
.    
But there are some other scholars that share a more optimistic view. Jer-
emy Rifkin
26
 sees the internet of things as harbingering a new era of 
growth: the shared economy. Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) are confi-
dent that a ‘beautiful partnership’ can include humans’ intuition and cre-
ativity and computers’ high routine processing, repetitive arithmetic and 
communication abilities. In France, Attali’s Positive Economy manifesto
27
 
sees space for an unselfish economy. Progressive Economy, an initiative 
launched in 2012 to stimulate a debate on economic and social policy and 
to promote progressive thinking, held a successful forum in March 2014 
enrolling Joseph Stiglitz
28
. At the same time there is room for analytic 
work on the future of jobs which is based on a dynamic analysis of auto-
mation combined with taxonomies of skills capabilities. Advances in 
information technology and robotics are already transforming the work-
place, and even greater changes lie ahead. Elliott (2014) looks at what 
the next two decades might bring. According to Steele (2014) what the 
world needs right now is the restoration of trust collapsed by rampant 
corruption at all level of government and representation, and this can be 
achieved by a grass root movement for collective decision-making based 
on open source everything: ‘The open source ecology is made up of a 
wide range of opens – open farm technology, open source software, 
23  See Reinert and Kattel (2004), and Reinert (2011). For the Baltic case see Sommers and 
Woolfson (2014). 
24  The point is made by Wolfgang Streeck, author of ‘Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of 
Democratic Capitalism’. See also ‘The Crises of Democratic Capitalism’: http://newleftreview.
org/II/71/wolfgang-streeck-the-crises-of-democratic-capitalism, last accessed May 2014. 
25  A full rendition of the terms of the debate is available online at: http://www.india-seminar.
com/2013/649/ 649_jurgen_habermas.htm, last accessed May 2014. 
26  See Rifkin (2014). People and communities are at the heart of this new economic paradigm, 
building the collaborative economy where consumers have been replaced by prosumers.
27  The Movement for a Positive Economy: a platform to develop relationships and create knowl-
edge about an economy that seeks more than profit, http://www.lh-forum.com, last accessed 
April 2014.
28  See http://www.progressiveeconomy.eu, last accessed April 2014.
7open hardware, open networks, open money, open small business tech-
nology, open patents – to name just a few’. Steele – a former CIA officer, 
sees a revolutionary tipping point as very close
29
. It only needs trigger – 
he says, a Tunisian fruit seller as was the case for the Arab spring. 
2. European Institutions as policy actors on a global stage 
It would be instructive to study how the ‘economic and social progress’ 
of the Treaty of Rome’s preamble evolved and condensed over the years 
to become just growth in much of the official European Institution’s com-
munication parlance today. The current narrative is not totally undisputed 
though. Recent European Commission communication on Horizon 2020 
work-program acknowledges the complex inter-linkages between innova-
tion, growth and employment. While the latest European Commission 
(2014) macroeconomic forecast report (Spring 2014) sees ‘genuine signs’ 
of economic recovery appearing after a double dip recession, the last 
report on Employment and Social Developments in Europe
30
 takes a more 
cautious interpretation. It encourages a more reflective stance in order to 
reconcile these allegedly positive signs with the challenging labour market 
developments, growing divergent patterns within the EU itself and insuf-
ficiently effective public policies in a narrow fiscal manoeuvring space. 
Meanwhile, the European Central Bank (ECB) is already running on a fast-
track to update its previous conservative approach. The understanding is 
that several transmission mechanisms are hampered or not fully efficient 
in the case of a dysfunctional and segmented European financial market. 
Given its recent monetary policy decisions (see Governing Council deci-
sions from June 5th, 2014), ECB might seem more courageous compared 
to other major central banks. But embracing actions that look like a shock 
therapy (i.e. negative interest rates) gives more the impression that 
Europe’s time is running out. It is not clear yet whether more money pour-
ing – via the banking sector – into an already over-indebt system can 
solve structural deficiencies
31
. At most, monetary policy might be effec-
29  ‘The preconditions of revolution exist in the UK, and most western countries. The number 
of active pre-conditions is quite stunning, from elite isolation to concentrated wealth to inade-
quate socialisation and education, to concentrated land holdings to loss of authority to repres-
sion of new technologies especially in relation to energy, to the atrophy of the public sector and 
spread of corruption, to media dishonesty, to mass unemployment of young men and on and 
on and on’, Steel, (2012).
30  See European Commission (2013).
31  The paradox is that the most of the Europe’s sovereigns which are now dealing with high 
debt burdens are also the ones required to increase their investments in education and social 
equity; these countries lag behind their EU peers when evaluated using common measures and 
indicators. Credit constrained households are the most likely ones to endure the negative con-
sequences arising from the lack of jobs and fair education opportunities. See the empirical and 
theoretical work of Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), Cameron and Taber (2004).
8tive to sail the economy across volatile business cycles; it cannot effec-
tively address the employment and social challenges we are facing today, 
which should be left for other institutional actors in charge with eco-
nomic and structural policy design. In the meantime the combination of 
low inflation and high public and private debt hangs menacingly over 
Europe (Münchau, 2014).
The IMF takes seriously into account the interplay between economic 
policies and income inequality, i.e. the distribution of both market and 
disposable income (see IMF, 2014). Some recent IMF staff working 
papers (i.e. not necessarily reflecting IMF views) have investigated link-
ages between inequality and economic imbalances (see Lebarz et al. 
2012) and between inequality and the duration of the spell of growth 
meaning that less unequal countries can take better advantages of eco-
nomic cycles turning to positive growth (see Ostry et al., 2014). A mea 
culpa IMF paper (see Ball et al., 2013) looks at the downsides of fiscal 
consolidation in OECD countries over the 1978-2009 period and draws a 
list including: increasing inequality, rising long-term unemployment and 
decreasing labour share. Discussing IMF’s recommendations on labour 
market policies, Blanchard et al. (2013) admit that the recent crisis was 
longer than expected and this prolongation had negative employment con-
sequences, especially on at-risk categories such as youth and low-skilled. 
OECD (2011) takes a broader perspective on the determinants of income 
inequality, considering globalization or off-shoring along with innovation 
and changes in labour market institutions and policies. The report sees 
nothing inevitable about rising inequalities and insists on using fiscal 
policy levers such as well-designed tax and transfer redistribution poli-
cies. Some other recipes concern: more intensive human capital invest-
ment (on-the-job training; formal education over working life) and inclu-
sive employment promotion (especially for underrepresented groups: 
youth, women, migrants). 
ILO expresses concerns about the decreasing trend in the GDP share of 
labour and the associated increase in the stake that goes to capital own-
ers in terms of profits, capital gains and rents (see ILO, 2012a). The 
entrenched developments observed in unemployment rates during the 
current crisis, especially in case of youth unemployment, and the poten-
tial negative consequences on human capital are summarized in O’Higgins 
(2010), ILO (2012b, 2013). These reports put forward some potential 
recipes to promote decent work for youth in the field of: education – to 
ease school-to-work transition; entrepreneurship and self-employment; 
active labour market policies – to focus on employment planning and job 
search assistance; pro-employment macroeconomic policies – to stimu-
late demand and ease financial constraints. 
93. What challenges and what recipes?
We leave short-term policy considerations related to financial markets 
functioning aside and instead discuss the long-term economic and policy 
consequences associated with the current employment and social chal-
lenges. According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), the present inno-
vation and globalization tsunami acts through several channels: (i) com-
puters substitute man’s labour, (ii) skill biased technological change dis-
tributes the impact of this unevenly, (iii) most markets become ‘winner 
takes all’ markets
32
 because of digitization and globalization. What are the 
consequences of these worrying developments? The authors do not sub-
scribe to the ‘classic view’, according to which some jobs are destroyed 
but other are created by the increased output due to the productivity gain 
and in the end we are all better off. This is not happening, the authors 
incline to conclude. They note that labour productivity and wages have 
become ‘decoupled’ since the late nineties, and that the wage share of 
GDP has declined with respect to the corporate profit share of GDP. This 
last point has been made before by other scholars like Thomas Piketty 
(and Anthony Atkinson and Emmanuel Saez). 
Innovation might lead to technological unemployment and other labour 
market related outcomes. For example, in Schumpeterian models of 
 creative destruction (see Aghion and Howitt, 1994, 2006), faster innova-
tion is accompanied by faster obsolesce of skills and, hence, higher labour 
turnover and (structural) unemployment. The unambiguously negative 
influence of technological progress on employment rests on the assump-
tions of irreversible investment and very costly technological update. The 
current grim economic context and high youth unemployment coupled 
with rigid labour market institutions do not certainly lay a favourable basis 
for Europe’s future
33
.
Serious studies still proclaim that ‘advanced technologies will not destroy 
jobs’, meaning that the received wisdom may not disappear overnight. 
After repeating the classic view that ‘[…] when a machine replaces a 
worker, there is a second-order effect: the organisation using the machine 
saves money and that money flows back into the economy either through 
lower prices, higher wages for the remaining workers or higher profits. In 
all three cases, the money gets spent, which stimulates demand that 
other companies respond to by hiring more workers’, Gros and Alcidi 
(2013) confine to a footnote the caveat that ‘This argument obviously 
32  In a ‘winner-takes-all’ market, the differences between the market winners and the losers is 
larger and might be growing because of high fixed cost imposed on production by innovation.
33  See Mroz and Savage (2006) and Kahn (2010) work on the long term consequences of 
youth unemployment.
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holds for well-functioning democratic economies, where the benefits of 
technological change are widely distributed within the whole society and 
are not concentrated in the hands of a few affluent people and autocrats.’ 
Based on the work cited thus far and the impact of inequality
34
 we beg to 
doubt that our democratic economies are all that well functioning, and 
that one should at least concede scope for circumspection. The report is 
not optimistic instead about Europe in general, suggesting that economic 
power and global share of Europe will shrink over the next decades, 
mainly because of emerging countries (China, India, Africa etc.).  
   
What recipes are put forward to tackle the ‘onrushing wave’ about to 
swipe the labour markets? Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) provide three 
chapters devoted to solutions: one for individuals (learning to race with 
machines), and two for policy-makers (present and long term). As far as 
the individuals are concerned – no surprise here – the only viable recipe 
is education. Unfortunately what skills shall be needed remains still 
unknown, though an important ingredient will be to work with machines 
instead of against them. Innovation itself should be exploited, and 
MOOCS (massive open online courses) are seen as a recipe to both 
improve the quality and the equity of education. The short term policy 
prescriptions are, again, Education; here the work of Eric A. Hanushek 
and Ludger Woessmann, is quoted – these authors ‘provide evidence that 
the robust association between cognitive skills [acquired at school] and 
economic growth reflects a causal effect of cognitive skills and supports 
the economic benefits of effective school policy’
35
. MOOCS are men-
tioned as well as investing on teachers and making them accountable. 
Kids should be kept in the classroom for longer hours. Startup should be 
nurtured, basic research fostered, infrastructures upgraded, regulation of 
new markets kept in check, Pigovian taxes (e.g. against pollution) levied, 
rents tackled, and more. 
The long term prescriptions given in Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) 
revisit the issue of basic income (salary for all) and of negative taxes (you 
may pay negative, zero or positive taxes depending on your income, 
where a negative tax is a subsidy). On a related topic, we mentioned right 
at the beginning of this brief Piketty’s book on Capital in the XXI century; 
the book’s main prescription is an annual progressive tax on wealth, 
worldwide, be it that the utopian nature of this measure is acknowledged 
by the same author.
34  In another footnote the authors of the CEPS report note: “the future evolution of income 
inequality within countries is extremely difficult to forecast. We have therefore not attempted 
to provide forecasts for this factor”.
35  See Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). 
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Again on education there is increasing attention toward a ‘learning econo-
my’ rather than ‘information economy’, where ‘learning is an interactive, 
socially embedded process; its efficiency depends on the institutional set-
up, the national innovation system. The content of the knowledge gener-
ated through learning is critical: tacit knowledge is essential for adjusting to 
change (flexibility) and for implementing change (innovation)’ (see Ernst and 
Lundvall, 2014). An even more critical reflection on the role of education, 
and what kind knowledge matters for innovation and growth, can be found 
in the latest book of Nassim N. Taleb (2012) on anti-fragility. Although 
predicting the skills that will be needed in the future is not simple, the best 
options in this enterprise, in terms of resilience / anti-fragility, is for Taleb 
to analyse what has worked well in the past – including for example read-
ing the classics. But these must be learned in school only up to a point, as 
for Taleb the best learner is the autodidact, and the best learning takes 
place on the field (on even better on the road). He believes that the arrow 
of causality goes from wealth to education and not the other way round, a 
view which most international organizations would disagree with.      
4. Final consideration 
The point of this brief is that business as usual – the received wisdom 
– is perhaps not the best course of action for the European project, if 
business as usual means continuing to appeal to the return of growth. 
This is not because we are happy about the possible end of growth – we 
don’t believe in Latouche’s décroissance heureuse (happy de-growth), but 
because: (i) growth is likely to be subdued in the coming years - in its 
current (April 2014) World Economic Outlook, the IMF essentially endors-
es the secular stagnation hypothesis; and (ii) growth is likely to accrue 
only to the elites in the present paradigm
36
. 
While making sure that opportunities for equitable growth are not missed, 
more attention should hence be paid to distributive justice and inter-
generational fairness
37
, to the respect for the rule of law and on to the 
control of the rent extracting elites. The effect of the consolidation exer-
cise on the most fragile countries should be carefully reconsidered in light 
of data based evidence. As per the role of innovation, governments 
should act as both leaders and investors by creating the main building 
blocks of an innovative environment: world-class R&D infrastructure and 
a high-performing education system. The EU needs projects where a 
36  Taken from Piketty (2014): ‘the richest 1 percent appropriated 60 percent of the increase 
in US national income between 1977 and 2007’
37  On fairness in EU narratives see Saltelli, A., d’Hombres, B. (2011). Subsequent JRC work 
pointed to linkages between income inequality and trust see European Commission (2013). 
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European identity can be established. Jobs and wages - for the median3 
EU citizen and his offspring - should be at the top of a new normative 
agenda and not disingenuously presented as a by-product of growth 
because this narrative has lost all legitimacy. The notion that “wealth 
raises all boats” has been debunked. 
The main problem with the generation of these new narratives is that of 
the story teller. To make an example, are the European Institutions still 
plausible storytellers today? And what story can Europeans be willing to 
listen to and whom from? The impression is that the ‘who’ speaking for 
the EU enterprise has gone lost in translation and that the legitimacy of 
EU Institutions has reached a nadir point
38
. 
Foremost the issue here is not one of ‘what’ but of ‘why’, e.g. an issue 
of normative economics rather than positive economics. We can only 
discuss sustainability of the EU enterprise if we first agree on what we 
want to sustain and for whom. This is where present narratives based on 
defending the Euro whatever it takes should be enriched with something 
different. All recipes currently available to reign in the crisis (a banking 
union, Germany willing to rebalance its economy, various forms of 
Keynesian intervention,…) are only meaningful if at stake there is more 
than just a common shared currency and it is up to the Europeans to spell 
out – in a much needed process of social inquiry
39
 – what this more 
should be. If the prevailing narrative remains one which divides European 
nations among virtuous and lazy little progress is possible. 
At the moment of writing the present note, EU leaders are engaged in an 
attempt to reconnect the European process with the EU citizens whose 
dissatisfaction was manifested in the recent European Elections. It seems 
that going from the Ventotene’s manifesto of 1941, to the Schuman 
declaration of the 1950, and to the Delors’ and Thatcher’s confronta-
tional speeches of 1988 (see Wall, 2008), we are left today poorer in that 
element which Joseph Weiler (2012) has called ‘messianic’ and which we 
could call ideal. It would be naïve to neglect this situation – and the asso-
ciated legitimacy crisis - in discussing possible new narratives.    
This brief highlights the fact that the European Institutions might benefit 
from opening up to different available paradigms in evaluating what has 
38  The point is made by J. H. H. Weiler, who argues that all streams of legitimacy for the EU 
enterprise have gone dry, including what he call input legitimacy (from democracy), output 
legitimacy (prom prosperity) and messianic legitimacy (the vision of the founding fathers, e.g. 
the Schuman declaration), see  Weiler (2012). 
39  John Dewey’s theory of social inquiry suggests that social progress can be achieved by 
applying the logic and attitude of successful scientific inquiries to morals and politics. 
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happened in the past and draw lessons for future policies. Possible fruitful 
avenues for exploration would be for example:
Heterodox economics. Much is happening along the sides of the 
mainstream economic theories and norms. The international stu-
dent initiative for more pluralism in how economics curricula are 
taught (http://www.isipe.net) has been already mentioned. A 
group of scholars based at the University of Paris 1 have launched 
a movement for Post-Autistic Economics (PAE), gathering behav-
ioural economics, heterodox economics, feminist economics, 
green economics, and econo-physics. We have already mentioned 
Jeremy Rifkin, and Jacques Attali’s, the Positive Economy and the 
Progressive Economy. The problem with all this hype for a new 
economic paradigm is that – to paraphrase Frank Knight – it is 
difficult to predict because it is unlike the past. One avenue of 
research we suggest is the work of Erik Reinert and what he calls 
German Historical School of Economics, or The Other Canon, 
inspired by Antonio Serra, by Schumpeterian dynamic imperfect 
competition, by Friedrich Nietzsche via Werner Sombart, and by 
many other continental scholars whose lesson – Reinert argues 
– has been forgotten in the last thirty years (Reinert, 2008). In his 
work ‘How Rich Countries Got Rich . . . and Why Poor Countries 
Stay Poor’, Erik S. Reinert argues that countries did not became 
rich by free trade following from day one Ricardian comparative 
advantage prescriptions, but strived to open to trade after having 
developed through a combination of government intervention, 
protectionism, and strategic investment, favourable terms of 
trade. The examples in the book range from the decision of Henry 
the VII to stop selling wools to the Italian manufacturers (the 
English Tudor Plan during 1485-1603) as to foster the develop-
ment of manufacture in England, to the United States following 
German – rather than English economic theories during the XIX 
century. In this theory favourable terms of trade are conquered via 
innovation, dynamically specializing in increasing return activities, 
typically linked to different classes of advanced manufacture, and 
moving away from diminishing return ones, e.g. those linked to 
agriculture or extractive industries. This school of thought’s sug-
gestion for action in the present EU predicament is strategic 
investment in increasing-returns green technologies (Mathews and 
Reinert, 2014). 
Bio-economics. The concept of bio-economics was introduced by 
Georgescu-Roegen as a critique of neo-classical economics 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; 1975; for an overview of this point 
see Mayumi, 2001). In particular he wanted to flag quantitative 
economic analysis’ scarce attention to the issue of scale. In his 
view, the ultimate goal of the economy is not “to produce and to 
consume goods and services” (the short term, local scale view), 
but rather “to reproduce and improve the set of processes required 
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to produce and to consume goods and services” (the long term, 
large scale view). Economy is better seen as a complex self-
organizing system that reproduces itself through an informed 
autocatalytic loop, rather than seeing it as a system producing 
outputs. Therefore, the concept of bio-economics implies moving 
from the analysis of what is produced, measured in monetary 
terms, to the analysis of patterns of production and consumption 
that are reproduced in the economic process, studying the relation 
between flows and production factors (funds) across different 
scales. The distinction between fund elements (production fac-
tors) and flow elements (the flows required to reproduce these 
production factors such as energy, material, water, monetary 
flows) forces the analyst to acknowledge, in the pre-analytical 
step, the choice of a given scale.  Fund elements must maintain 
their identity during the duration – the time horizon - of the analy-
sis, whereas flow element either disappear or appear during the 
duration of the analysis. Therefore, this analysis makes it possible 
to keep a direct focus on key characteristics of the performance 
of the economy – employment, level of education, life expectan-
cy, size and performance of institutions, availability of technical 
capital in the different compartments of the society, changes and 
characteristics of land use. 
Opening to alternative framings of the present predicaments could help 
us to understand what happened to EU in terms of labour market dynam-
ics and technological progress, economic integration, competitiveness, 
asymmetric dynamics and policy responses. To give an example of the 
type of questions that might be addressed:  
Technological progress or technological primitivisation? A neo-
liberal stance in political economy comes with a neo-classic 
stance in economics proper, which implies light touch regulation, 
financial de-regulation, and so on. It has been argued that the big 
bang enlargement in 2004 led to visible damage, due to an 
increase in cross-border financial intermediation without a proper 
coordination in prudential supervision, coupled with a consistent 
de-industrialization of accessing countries and persistent trade 
deficits, see Reinert and Kattel (2004, based on ILO data), Reinert 
(2011). For the Baltic case see Sommers and Woolfson (2014). 
As predicted by non-Ricardian economics, the poor became poor-
er and the rich richer, a situation which the crisis has made worse 
(ibidem). Along the same lines, Bertola (2013) discusses the real 
convergence challenges arising from the difference in financial and 
trade integration between Eurozone Member States on the back 
of asymmetric and uncoordinated policy responses. As growing 
external imbalances were partly motivated by productivity conver-
gence expectations across a financially integrated area, Europe 
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first needs to understand what has derailed these expectations
40
. 
In a recent Bundesbank discussion paper Borsi and Metiu (2013) 
find no overall real income per capita convergence in the EU, but 
– in the long run - the formation of convergence clubs with a clear 
separation between the new and old EU member states. Though 
these authors sift unconvincingly through different causes to this 
status of affair (including consumers spending), their finding are 
congruent with the prediction of Reinert (2011), including in the 
success of Ireland which embraced increasing return activities 
with its revolution in the field of information and communication 
technologies. 
The first step though is to make ex-post policy (impact) evaluation pos-
sible, by being open to new paradigms and new perspectives. European 
decision makers could add some fresh thinking based on evidence and 
data, but more importantly based on a plurality of analyses not necessar-
ily reflecting past narratives of the organization. This would allow glimps-
ing beyond the current understanding and might help shape future poli-
cies that benefit the EU and its citizens. Knowledge has a privileged role 
in legitimating a common authority in pluralist societies
41
. The broader 
debate on knowledge, democracy and markets mentioned at the begin-
ning of this brief in relation to the work of Wolfgang Streeck, Jürgen 
Habermas, Philippe Legrain and others tells us that better policies based 
on better evidence can go some way in sustaining the legitimacy of the 
European Union.
40  Possible answers might refer to the global financial crisis that initiated in the US or the 
uncoordinated nature of policy actions and the lack of transnational risk-sharing mechanisms 
across EU.
41  Modern science has long been an unquestioned source of truth that offers legitimacy to a 
common authority in pluralist societies (see Shapin and Schaffer, 1985). ‘Solutions to the prob-
lem of knowledge are solutions to the problem of social order’, according to this important 
work.  See also Lyotard (1979). ‘Who decides what counts as knowledge and who knows 
about what one must decide? […] The question of knowledge in the information society is more 
than ever the question of government’.
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